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Abstract. This paper analyses the impact of education networks on the FDI from the United States 
and United Kingdom to 167 countries during 1999-2011. Proxies of networks are international 
students in the US and UK and alumni associations abroad. Results show that international students 
boost the British FDI to their home countries, while their influence on American FDI is weak, 
except for students from developing economies and for international students who attended 
university during the Cold War. Alumni associations have a substantial impact on both American 
and British FDI, but especially on the latter. The stronger impact of education networks on British 
FDI is partly related to the different political and economic roles played by the US and UK on the 
world stage, and to their different use of soft and hard power. Results are robust to different 
econometric specifications.  
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1. Introduction. 
Commanding a squadron of American warships, Commodore Matthew C. Perry entered 
Japanese waters in 1852 and threatened to use force if the country refused to open to trade. The 
move was dictated by the country’s hermetic closure to the rest of the world over the previous two 
centuries and the rich profits anticipated from its opening to free economic exchanges. As a 
response, the Japanese authorities agreed to sign a treaty that seemingly conceded what the United 
States and other Western nations wanted but, in fact, left the country’s gates essentially closed. In 
1863, a small group of British merchant vessels quietly helped five young noblemen to escape the 
country and reach the United Kingdom, where they studied at University College London. After 
completing their studies, the five returned home, held important political and administrative 
positions and, more importantly, supported a change of imperial dynasty and mentality that 
eventually opened the country to the international flows of goods and peoples.1 This is just one 
example of the roles of force – or the threat of it – and persuasion in the history of trade and 
international politics; but many others could be made, even with the same countries playing 
different parts.  
That outcome was remarkable, but it was neither entirely fortuitous nor unique. The five 
young Japanese students were only a tiny fraction of the foreign students studying at British 
universities at that time, and represented only a few of those who during their adult lives actively 
sought to build links between their homeland and the United Kingdom. British authorities were 
aware of this potential result, as well as its underlying mechanisms. They knew that during the years 
at university students typically develop strong and enduring ties of friendship among themselves 
and an attachment with their university and host country, and that together this could help Britain to 
improve relations with their respective home economies.  
The bridging potential of foreign students is now considered a form of soft power. Nye (2005) 
defines soft power as the capacity of influencing the preferences of others through persuasion and 
attraction, rather than through coercion or payment. International students and scholars, literature, 
and classical music, are forms of soft power that can influence the preferences of elites, while pop 
music, cinema, TV, and economic aid, are more likely to influence the tastes of the masses. The soft 
power aimed at the elites is supposedly the most efficacious in influencing the political orientation 
and economic policies of a foreign country. At the other extreme, hard power is the use of force 
through wars, military coercion, or economic blockades. Espionage and covert action are usually 
classified as hard power, even though their influence on the masses is less clear, as it depends on 
                                                            
1 The five young Japanese, known as “the Choshu-Five”, studied at University College London (UCL)  and were hosted 
at the home of a UCL’s professor. Today, two monuments celebrate their enterprise, one in the grounds of UCL, and 
another at Yamaguchi University, Japan. 
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how much is perceived. Hard power is thought to deploy its consequences in the short run, while 
the effects of soft power are long lasting. An often debated point is whether or not soft power 
without the backing of force can actually be effective. Nye (2005) has named smart power the wise 
combination of the two.  
Since the times of the British and European empires, the number students moving abroad for 
their studies and the number of countries involved in their flows have greatly increased. According 
to UNESCO’s definition and statistics, international students are students who move to a foreign 
country for the purpose of tertiary studies. They were 50.000 in 1950, 2.1 million in 2002 and 3.4 
million in 2010. This huge growth in numbers has stimulated research and debate, but the full 
implications of the movements of students across countries are still poorly understood. International 
students are mostly considered as a subgroup of skilled migrants, and hence as human capital, or  
productive factors, while the important political, cultural and economic links between countries that 
they can generate tend to be overlooked. In particular, the economic research focuses on the 
incentives of students to move abroad, the reasons for universities to attract students (Bessey, 2012; 
Beine, 2012; Kahanec and Králiková, 2011; Haupt et al., 2011; Van Bouwel and Veugelers, 2010), 
or the brain gains and losses for receiving and sending countries (Le, 2010; Chellaraj et al., 2008; 
Freeman, 2010). Only very few studies examine the impact of international students on the relations 
between countries. Among these, Spilimbergo (2009) tests the influence of foreign students on 
political systems, and (Murat, 2014) on bilateral trade.   
The main thesis of this paper is that the positive influence of foreign students on the economic 
exchanges between countries that was believed to work in the past is still active. Specifically, I 
measure the impact of university ties on the foreign direct investments (FDI) of today's two main 
receiving countries, the United States and United Kingdom, in 167 students’ home countries during 
the years 1999-2011. In 2010, 21% and 12% of international students were attending American and 
British universities (UNESCO). To this end, I use different proxies of education ties. One concerns 
the number of international students attending American and British universities during the years 
1999-2011. Data are taken from the statistics on international students published by UNESCO as a 
homogeneous series since 1998. Secondly, I utilize data on foreign students that attended university 
at the beginning of the seventies, in particular during the academic year 1970/71. On average these 
former students are in their fifties and early sixties during the database timespan. These data are 
published by the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. A third, more direct, indicator of active education 
ties is the number of alumni associations of US and UK universities in each foreign country. 
Alumni associations are a common phenomenon of universities of English-speaking countries. 
Their central offices generally are on the university premises, while branches spread to many other 
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locations in the country and abroad. As no official statistics on their numbers exist, I collected the 
evidence available on the universities websites or kindly provided by the universities themselves 
and built two novel databases on the alumni associations of American and British universities in the 
167 partner countries considered.  
The main findings of this paper are that the impact of education links on is positive and strong 
on the British and weak on the American investments in the students’ home countries. This 
difference is robust to different regressors and dependent variables. Further controls including 
indicators of the different roles played by the US and UK on the world scenario – the US a 
superpower, the UK a former empire – partially explain but do not change the main results. The 
remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents some facts and the literature on 
social and education networks. Section 3 presents the statistics of the variables of interest and 
indicates the data sources. The estimation strategy is developed in successive steps is in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 gives the conclusions.   
 
2. Facts and literature  
Back in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Britain hosted students  from all over the 
world: Europe, settlement countries, colonies and other nations and states. There weren’t as many 
students from poor countries as from rich ones, but their bridging potential with the homeland was 
thought to be the most important and precious, since relations with rich and settlement countries 
were already well established (Pietsch, 2009). On the other hand, students from poor countries were 
eager to move to Britain for their studies, as this could secure prestigious jobs after graduation, 
especially in the professions, commerce and bureaucracy. In later decades, with decolonization, 
some former international students became leaders of independence movements and heads of state 
in their homelands (Spilimbergo, 2009, Perraton, 2014).  
After the second world war, the economic and political influence of the United States 
overcame that of the United Kingdom, making it a ‘superpower’ and, naturally, the preferred 
destination of international students. There was, however, another superpower that competed with 
the US at all levels, and was also interested into attracting students from abroad, the USSR. Ideally 
and effectively they divided the world into two separate blocks, and each offered scholarships and 
fellowships to foreign students and scholars (Perraton, 2014; Spilimbergo, 2009; Pietsch, 2009). Of 
special interest were students originating from the Third World and politically nonaligned countries, 
which were at risk of establishing alliances with the rival superpower. As in earlier times, the main 
goal was an improvement in the relations with students’ home countries but, more than before, 
political and strategic considerations came first, over immediate economic convenience  (Brawner 
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and Lucas, 2007). The Cold War, and the ever-present possibility of a devastating armed 
confrontation between the two superpowers, had made the use of persuasion and soft power more 
important than ever.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of the world into two contending 
blocks, the political and economic world scenario gradually became more heterogeneous and 
fragmented. During the nineties, perhaps because of its unique role of leading nation, the direct 
interest of the United States in attracting foreign students faded, and the funds dedicated to 
international scholarships gradually shrank (Brawner and Lucas, 2007). Later, the terrorist attacks 
of September 2001 made the government’s position definite again, but this time against the growing 
inflows of foreign students. First and foremost came the security of the country, and students from 
abroad were seen as potential carriers of peril, especially when originating from certain world areas. 
For a few years after 2001, total inflows in the US stagnated, and those from Arab and some 
African countries fell (Figure A.1).  
On the other side of the Atlantic, the British attitude with respect to international students has 
been more constant throughout time. The interest on international students as a way of improving 
international relations has never completely faded and, rather, perhaps because of the lost 
supremacy and diminished military potential after the second world war, has even increased, at least 
until very recent times. Since 2010, UK policies on international students’ entry visas, grants and 
scholarships  have become more restrictive (Perraton, 2014), but these measures, with their long 
term implications, are frequently debated in newspapers, magazines and specific studies. Among 
others, Hurn and Tomalin (2013) stress the importance of attracting international students to 
strengthen Britain’s’ soft power, and, consequently, improve relations with areas of the world that 
can be crucial for the future development of the economy.  
By moving to study abroad, and through their university ties and networks, students build 
links between countries. A branch of the literature analyses the effect of social networks on the 
economic exchanges. The base assumption of networks’ theory is that the interactions between 
individuals lower the fixed costs of market transactions. At the international level, these costs are 
generated by social, cultural, and institutional dissimilarities between countries. By smoothing out 
these dissimilarities, networks boost bilateral trade and FDI (Rauch, 1999; 2001). Several empirical 
studies, focusing mostly on the social networks of migrants, provide support for this hypothesis, 
Some authors test the impact of migrant ties on the bilateral trade exchanges between the host and 
the origin countries; among these: Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and Trindade 2002; 
Wagner et al., 2002; Combes et al., 2005; Herander and Saavedra, 2005; Blanes and Martín-
Montaner, 2006; White, 2007; Tadesse and White, 2008;  Bandyopadhyay  et al., 2008; Buch et al. 
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2006; Peri and Requena 2010;  Aleksynska and Peri, 2012; Egger et al., 2012; Felbermayr and 
Toubal, 2012.  Other studies focus on the relation between international networks and FDI, (among 
others: Gao, 2003; Tong, 2005; Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010; Javorcik at al., 2011; Flisi and 
Murat, 2011) finding, in some cases, that FDI are more likely than trade to be promoted by 
networks of skilled individuals. Both regarding bilateral trade and FDI, and in agreement with the 
base assumption of networks theory, some studies find that the effects of social transnational links 
tend to be stronger as countries are more dissimilar (Girma and Yu, 2002; Dunlevy, 2006; Kugler 
and Rapoport, 2007; Tong, 2005).  
Another branch of the literature studies the characteristics of the network ties of university 
students. Using data on American colleges and universities, Marmaros and  Sacerdote (2006), 
Mayer and Puller (2008), Arcidiacono et al. (2011), Baker et al. (2011), Neri and Ville (2008) find 
that some links are particularly robust. Cohen et al. (2008) test the investment decisions of adult 
individuals who have the choice of placing their investments with former university mates or with 
anonymous partners, and find that university mates are significantly preferred. This suggests that 
university links can be long-lasting, and evolve sometimes into business ties.  
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics. 
This paper uses three proxies for education networks: International students, who are students 
that attended American and British universities during 1999-2011, International students1970, who 
attended university during the academic year 1970/71, and the number of Alumni associations of 
American and British universities in foreign countries. The first two variables concern stocks of 
international students registered during each academic year. Alumni associations, is a time-invariant 
variable, and the more direct proxy of networking activity. It reports the decision of former students 
to create a formal group, to remain linked to the alma mater, to meet with each other on regular 
basis, and to exchange news and information. More than for international students, these exchanges 
are likely to convey valuable economic knowledge and information, which can influence FDI. The 
evidence available shows that the representatives of associations – often denominated 
‘ambassadors’ – held a degree in Economics, Business, Engineering or a scientific discipline more 
frequently than in the Humanities.  
For the purpose of this investigation, I collected the information available on alumni 
associations on the universities websites during year 2012, with which I built two variables, one 
concerning 1759 American, and the other 1895 British associations, which are the foreign branches 
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of the associations of alumni of 62 American and 50 British universities.2 These data show that 
associations are present in many countries and in all continents. Figures on the number of members 
of each association were not always available, but some universities websites reveal that their 
alumni are hundreds or tens of thousands. For example, in the alumni website of Oxford University 
is written ‘There are currently more than 200,000 Oxford alumni in over 88 countries (about one-
third are based overseas)’. Interestingly, the alumni associations of business schools are often kept 
distinct from all other alumni associations, and have separate offices within university premises.3 
The spread and importance of all kind of alumni associations abroad is related to the long history of 
university alumni in the US and, more recently, in the UK. Some American associations of alumni 
are as old as or older than their alma mater.4  
In 1970 there were less international students than in 1999-2011, but, more importantly, the 
distribution of their countries of origin was different. During 1970, and in general during the Cold 
War, students from communist economies were just a tiny fraction of the total number of foreign 
students, while they are an important proportion of all international students in American and 
British universities, especially if originating from China, Vietnam and (mainly in the UK) Eastern 
European countries (Table A.1).  
Overall, since the early seventies, and especially since the beginning of the nineties the 
aggregate number of international students has constantly grown. Figures 1-3-5 show that the 
increase concerns especially students from Asia – going to the United States, the United Kingdom 
and to the world –. The flows of students from Africa and Latin America register a halt since the 
                                                            
2 Data on associations abroad were collected from all university websites that provided this information during year 
2012. The staff of Manchester University (UK) kindly provided data. The databases on the US and UK foreign branches 
of alumni associations are available from the author on request. 
3 Business alumni associations of Harvard, Stanford, Oxford, Rutgers, Penn state and several other universities have 
their distinct offices and websites. On the Alumni website of Penn State University is written: ‘The Penn State 
community includes more than 610,000 alumni located in every corner of the world. Within that network, graduates of 
the Smeal College of Business number more than 74,000.’ More specifically, the number of Penn State Alumni with 
Penn State Alumni Association Membership is more than 172,000, about 30.% of the total’.  If the same proportion is 
applied to Smeal College, then registered members of business alumni associations are about 23.000. If only one third 
of all associate alumni are abroad (using the proportion of Oxford alumni abroad), then there are 52,460 associated 
alumni, of whom 6,780 business alumni, of Penn State University alone in foreign countries. Some Alumni associations 
of the London Business School membership numbers are: 2,399 in China, 4,307 in India, 3,900 in other Asian 
countries, 1,275 in Australia and New Zealand, 2,158 in Brazil, 2,782 in other Latin American countries, 2,502 in 
Africa, over 1,300 in the Middle East, 1,694 in eastern Europe, 1,930 in France, 544 in Greece.   
4 The following alumni associations exist since: 1792, Yale (http://aya.yale.edu/content/history); 1840, Harvard, 
(http://alumni.harvard.edu/about-haa/history);  1875, MIT (http://libraries.mit.edu/sites/mithistory/institute/committees/association-of-alumni-and-
alumnae-of-the-massachusetts-institute-of-technology/);   1870, Penn State University (http://alumni.psu.edu/about_us/history); 1872, 
University of Berkeley(http://alumni.berkeley.edu/about-caa); 1889, University of Washington 
(http://www.washington.edu/alumni/about/history.htm); 1897, California Institute of Technology 
(https://alumni.caltech.edu/history);1906,  University of Florida (http://www.ufalumni.ufl.edu/about/); 1927, Texas Tech 
(http://www.texastechalumni.org/s/1422/3col.aspx?sid=1422&gid=1&pgid=449); 1875, Virginia Tech (http://www. 
alumni.vt.edu/about/history.html); 1925, UCLA (http://alumni.ucla.edu/alumni-association/history/default.aspx);  1907, Cal Poly 
(http://alumni.calpoly.edu/content/about_cpaa/cpaa_history); 1878,  Iowa State University 
(http://www.isualum.org/en/about_us/association_history/).  
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mid-seventies and beginning of eighties for about a decade, while those from Europe and North 
America grow more constantly. The presence of international students in the United States 
decreases for some years after 2001, especially if originating from Arab countries (Figure A.1), and 
except for students originating from Asia (Figure 1). Patterns are different in the United Kingdom, 
where since the end of the sixties the presence of students from all regions, except Africa, increases 
more or less steadily. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, numbers from Asia and Eastern Europe 
increase more rapidly than average. British investments abroad also follow a more regular pattern 
than those of the United States (Figures 3-4). 
Figure 6 shows that the proportion of international students in the United States on world 
totals decreases constantly since the end of the eighties, and that the contraction becomes more 
rapid after 2002. This  can be explained by the diminished interest of the country on international 
students after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and since 2001, by the adoption of more restrictive policies 
on students’ visas. The same shares in the United Kingdom follow a quite different path: it 
increases until the end of the nineties, to become flat or decreases only slightly afterwards. Given 
the rapid increase in world numbers, the latter is accompanied by the high and positive growth in 
levels of Figure 3.  
  Up to this point, geographic areas rather than the level of development of countries have 
been considered. However, the latter becomes relevant when the hypothesis of networks theory  that 
social links matter especially when countries are dissimilar is taken into account. As a 
differentiation between rich countries with similar institutions – OECD economies – and other 
countries – non-OECD - will be part of the empirical testing in this paper, some statistics on these 
two aggregates are of interest. Table 1, based on this paper’s dataset, shows that during 1999-2011 
the majority of international students in American and British universities originate from other 
developed, or OECD, countries, but also that numbers from non-OECD economies register the most 
rapid growth rates. Specifically, the average number of students from OECD economies in the US 
was more than twice the inflow of students from emerging and developing (non-OECD) countries, 
while in the UK this proportion was about four to one. The number of students from developing 
countries increased at a rate of 11.2% per year in the United States and 9.75% in the United 
Kingdom, while the growth rates from developed countries have been of about 3% for both the US 
and UK. The distributions of Alumni associations and International students1970 follow a similar 
pattern: the largest numbers are in OECD countries.  
The outward American and British FDI, depicted in Figures 2 and 4, grow significantly since 
the end of the eighties, especially toward Asian countries and the Western Economies (North 
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mean std.dev mean std.dev mean std.dev mean std.dev
Outward FDI Overall 60,743.50 93,662.00 3,324.80 9,543.30 38,321.01 73,149.00 1,905.70 5,231.50
Between 85,045.00 7,836.10 70,936.00 3,669.10
Within 41,293.00 3,980.40 20,781.00 2,774.40
12.17 22.15 17.32 47.01
International Students1999-2011 Overall 6,926 12,680.00 2,599 10,169.00 4,623 5,357.40 1,127 4,090.90
Between 12,581.00 9,719.50 5,227.90 3,583.00
Within 2,741.40 3,031.20 1,495.50 1,995.70
Growth (%) 3.1 11.2 3.56 9.75
International students1970 Overall 1339 2055.33 657 1735 838 975.70 374 852.64
Alumni associations Overall 25.62 18.56 7.36 14.2 31.17 51.45 7.18 13.59
Growth (%)
Notes : OECD, non-OECD economies in 1999. FDI: outward stocks in partner countries (mil. of US$). International students: stocks in USA and UK. Alumni 
associations: number of alumni associations of USA and UK Universities in partner countries.
Table 1. - Summary statistics of some variables of interest
United States United Kingdom
OECD OECDnon-OECD non-OECD
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America and Western Europe in the Figures). If, instead, the division of countries between 
OECD and non-OECD is considered,  the Table 1 shows that, as for international students, the 
American and British FDI are directed especially to other developed (OECD) countries, but that 
they have grown rapidly especially toward the developing economies.  The detailed definitions and 
sources of all variables and data utilized in this paper are listed in Table A.2.  
 
4. Estimation strategy 
4.1 Baseline specification 
The basic question I seek to examine is whether international students in the United States 
and United Kingdom and alumni abroad influence the volume of FDI from the two host countries to 
the students’ home countries. To do so, I firstly estimate the following gravity base model 
(Feenstra, 2004): 
 
ln FDIct = α + δ ln Education networksct + XctΠ + αt + λc + εct                               (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the stock of outward FDI of the United States or United Kingdom 
in country c at time t. The two countries’ regressions are run separately. The explanatory variable of 
interest is Education networks. Its proxies are, respectively, the stocks of International students 
from country c at time t present in the United States or United Kingdom during the period 1999-
2011, International students1970, students who attended university during the academic year 
1970/71, and the stocks of Alumni associations of American or British universities in country c.  
The information on FDI is available for years 1999 to 2011. 
Xct is a vector including several variables, specific to the partner country c, commonly used 
in the literature on FDI determinants. They are: GDP, a proxy for the purchasing power of 
consumers in the partner country; Population size to capture the potential market size of the 
country; Distance of the country from the Unites States or United Kingdom to account for 
transaction costs related to travel, communications and cultural distance; the average Inflation in 
country c at time t to control for macroeconomic stability; a time-varying index of the Quality of 
institutions, to proxy  the bureaucratic and political costs of transactions; the proportion of people 
speaking English, to denote cultural similarities and possibility of obtaining information about 
business conditions; the Free trade agreements between the United States or the United Kingdom 
and the partner country. The model includes time dummies, αt, and countries’ fixed effects, λc. All 
variables, except dummies and percentages are in logarithms. 
4.2. Endogeneity 
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Coefficients on International students (concerning the period 1999-2011), and Alumni 
associations abroad can suffer from reverse causality, omitted variable bias, or measurement error, 
while international students of 1970/71 can be safely thought to be uncorrelated with the error terms 
of equation (1). To try to obviate for endogeneity problems, I use the Blundell-Bond (1998) System 
GMM estimator when the proxy of education networks is International students, and the GMM 
instrumental variables approach (IV-GMM) when the variable of interest is Alumni associations. 
The latter variable is time-invariant and could not be instrumented with its own lags as required in 
the GMM specification.  
In both the US and UK regressions the Alumni associations variable is instrumented with 
the alumni associations of the other receiving economy (i.e. the British Alumni associations are 
instrumented with the American Alumni associations, and vice versa), and with the level of 
democracy in the students’ home country (democracy as defined by Cheibub et al., 2010). The 
rationale for these two instruments is, regarding the first, that a higher number of alumni 
associations from a given country can determine, through a ‘contagion’ effect, the formation of new  
alumni associations from another country. Specifically, more associations of alumni from American 
universities can be an incentive for returning students from British universities to establish their 
own associations, and vice versa. Regarding the second instrument, democracy, more democratic 
nations tend to be more open to cross-country cultural exchanges (Spilimbergo, 2009) and to 
provide a more favourable environment for intellectual associative activities (Freitag, 2006), and 
alumni associations.   Both instruments are expected to be uncorrelated with the error terms of the 
baseline equation. 
4.3. Soft, covert and hard power. 
Up to this point, the specific roles of the US and the UK on the international stage have not 
been considered, but in the real world the two countries differ in significant ways. An obvious 
difference between the two is that the US is a superpower with a strong political, economic, cultural 
and military impact on several world areas and countries, while the UK is a former empire, with a 
much more limited military and economic power, but with a still significant political and cultural 
influence around the globe. All this can affect not only the capacity of American and British 
multinationals to access foreign markets but also the relative weight that persuasion or force may 
have in the process. In general, countries with stronger military and intelligence capacities may 
depend less on the use of persuasion, while those with less military power may have more 
incentives to invest comparatively more resources in soft power, cultural diplomacy and other 
peaceful ways of establishing relations with foreign nations. Consequently, potential omitted 
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variables in the above specification should relate to different forms of power or persuasion used by 
the US and UK in their interactions with other countries.  
Hence, too the above specification, I first add two covariates related to the use of either soft 
power or force. One is the amount of economic aid (in millions of US$) provided to the partner 
country, the other is the number of wars fought with it since the end of the second world war. As aid 
can improve the trust of people in the foreign on the donor country, it can be considered a form of 
soft power. Guiso et al. (2009) find that higher levels of trust between people of two different 
countries positively affect the bilateral economic exchanges between the countries. At the same 
time, aid can also affect FDI more directly by positively influencing the preferences of consumers 
for the goods of the donor country. Moreover, aid provisions are often accompanied by bilateral 
trade and, in some cases,  investment treaties (Selaya and Sunesen, 2012). For similar and opposite 
reasons, the number of wars fought with the foreign country are expected to have a direct disruptive 
influence on trade and FDI (Barbieri and Levy, 1999; Martin et al., 2008) and an indirect effect 
through the weakening of trust and social ties – including education ties – between the people of the 
two countries. However, after the second world war, wars have been increasingly fought for 
political or humanitarian reasons, rather than for a military victory over the ‘enemy country’, and 
have been fought, especially by the UK, as part of a wide coalition of countries. The effects on 
bilateral FDI of these locally and temporarily limited wars can therefore be less disruptive that those 
of more traditional ones. This makes the coefficient on the Wars variable difficult a priory to sign.   
I then add two covariates, one in the regressions concerning the US FDI and the other in 
those concerning the UK FDI. In the first, I include a variable concerning the use of covert power. 
Both the US and the UK governments rely on the services of secret intelligence agencies operating 
in foreign countries, and indicators of their activities for both the US and the UK would be useful 
for this study, but information have been made available only on past operations of the American 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Using these data, Berger et al. (2013) find that, during the Cold 
War years, 1945 to 1989, CIA interventions in foreign countries had a positive impact on US 
exports. They also find that the effect is higher on less democratic countries. In this paper I use the 
data made available by Berger et al.(2013) to test the impact of the number of CIA operations in the 
foreign country since 1945 to 1989 on the American investments abroad during 1999-2011. Hence, 
I test the effect of CIA on FDI rather than on trade, and in the long run. Following Berger at 
al.(2013) the coefficient on CIA could be expected to take a positive value, but following Nye 
(2005) and his thesis on covert intervention being hard power, it should take a negative one.  
In the regressions on UK data, I add a proxy for cultural diplomacy: the number of branches 
of the British Council in the foreign country. The British Council is an institution having a 
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reputation and importance are well-established all over the world. Its goal is that of disseminating 
abroad the culture and language of the United Kingdom, and of building trust between people of the 
UK and other countries. It provides useful information and practical services to foreign students 
wishing to study in Britain, and to other people wanting to know the United Kingdom. Other 
countries with similar institutions are, among others, France with the Alliance Français, Germany, 
with the Goethe Institut, Italy, with the Dante Alighieri association, Spain, with the Instituto 
Cervantes,  China, with the Confucius Institute. In this case, there are no data available on the 
branches of an equivalent American institution because it does not exist: there is no equivalent US 
institution representing the United States culture, language, history and cultural traditions abroad. 
The coefficient on the British Council variable is expected to be positive. Aid, Wars, CIA and 
British Council are control variables that, by being expression of soft, hard and covert power, can 
also be potentially correlated with International students. It can be reasonably expected that the 
positive effects of education networks on FDI are weakened by the use of hard and covert power, 
and complemented by other forms of soft power, as Aid.   
 
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline specification: OLS and FE.  
Tables 2.a and 2.b. depict the coefficients of the baseline regressions and evidence three 
main results. First, the impact of International students is stronger and more robust on British than 
on American bilateral FDI. Second, international students who attended American and British 
universities during the beginning of the seventies (International students1970), senior workers and 
professionals during the database timespan, have a positive and significant influence on both 
American and British outward FDI. Third, Alumni associations have a higher and more significant 
influence than international students. Also in this case, alumni associations have a higher influence 
on the British FDI.  
More specifically, International students affect the American FDI in Model 1 (Table 2.a.), 
but the relation loses significance once other control variables are added to the model. Differently, 
coefficients on International students in UK are positive, higher than those in the US regressions, 
and significant in all specifications. In Model 2 of Table 2.b., a 1% increase in the number of 
students originating from country c increases the British FDI in country c by 0.32%; with 
significance at 1%. The result is confirmed when the lagged dependent variable is included among 
the regressors (Model 5); in this case, the long run value of the coefficient on international students  
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Table 2.a. - Investments abroad. Dependent variable: outward FDI of the United States 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS LDV OLS LDV FE FE LDV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FDIt-1         0.955*** 0.950***   0.650*** 
          (0.015) (0.015)   (0.056) 
                  
International students 0.283** 0.167     -0.002   -0.035 -0.031 
  (1.123) (0.116)     (1.020)   (1.152) (1.074) 
International students1970     0.256***           
      (0.082)           
Alumni associations       0.817***   0.051     
        (0.180)   (0.031)     
                  
GDP 1.524*** 1.386*** 1.349*** 1.143*** 0.054* 0.041 0.445* 0.354*** 
  (0.087) (0.135) (0.140) (0.160) (0.033) (0.033) (0.233) (0.100) 
Population -0.724*** -0.398** -0.499*** -0.467*** 0.02 0.007 -1.606 -0.813 
  (0.123) (0.182) (0.180) (0.174) (0.033) (0.032) (1.202) (0.580) 
Distance -1.118*** -0.810*** -0.689*** -0.811*** 0.011 0.012     
  (0.209) (0.225) (0.223) (0.207) (0.038) (0.038)     
Free trade agreements   0.751*** 0.504* 0.25 0.079 0.043     
    (0.287) (0.293) (0.272) (0.051) (0.051)     
Inflation   0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.001 0.001 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Quality of institutions   0.13 0.178 -0.07 0.053 0.041 0.123 -0.199 
    (0.283) (0.298) (0.271) (0.054) (0.053) (0.397) (0.206) 
English language -% 
population 
  0.016*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.001 0.001     
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)     
                  
Observations 1,723 1,712 1,671 1,716 1,442 1,444 1,711 1,442 
R-squared 0.716 0.734 0.737 0.751 0.966 0.966 0.082 0.486 
Number of countries 164 164 164 164 163 163 164 163 
Notes: all variables are in logs except dummies and percentages. HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies 
and constant in all regressions. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising data between 1999-2011. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
is 0.44, with significance at 1%.5 The magnitude of the coefficient shrinks to 0.18 when countries’ 
fixed effects are added to the model (Model 7) and remains constant when the lagged dependent 
variable is included  (the long run value of the coefficient on International students in Model 8 is 
0.18). Hence, the relation between international students in the UK and UK FDI investments in the 
students’ home countries  is positive and significant, with a magnitude varying between 0.18 and 
0.44.  
                                                            
5  From  yt =  𝑎�yt-1 +𝑏�𝑥𝑡, 𝑏�𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑛= 𝑏�1−𝑎� 
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International students1970 have a similar, positive and significant influence on both the 
American and British investments abroad. Specifically, a 1% increase in International students1970  
Table 2.b. - Investments abroad. Dependent variable: outward FDI of the United 
Kingdom 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
OLS 
LDV 
OLS 
LDV FE FE LDV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FDIt-1         0.859*** 0.848***   0.253*** 
          (0.045) (0.047)   (0.088) 
                  
International students 0.723*** 0.325***     0.061***   0.178* 0.135* 
  (0.127) (0.080)     (0.024)   (0.096) (0.075) 
International students1970     0.224***           
      (0.064)           
Alumni associations       0.718***   0.151***     
        (0.152)   (0.052)     
                  
GDP 0.698*** 0.235* 0.305** 0.213** 0.028 0.025 0.188 0.250** 
  (0.167) (0.123) (0.128) (0.107) (0.024) (0.023) (0.167) (0.126) 
Population -0.226 0.791*** 0.827*** 0.659*** 0.116** 0.092** 0.490 0.836 
  (0.157) (0.170) (0.175) (0.167) (0.050) (0.047) (1.073) (0.690) 
Distance -0.137 0.013 -0.103 -0.183 -0.015 -0.057*     
  (0.169) (0.144) (0.144) (0.148) (0.029) (0.033)     
Free trade agreements   0.009 -0.194 -0.102 -0.021 -0.039 -0.282 -0.329 
    (0.297) (0.275) (0.295) (0.071) (0.072) (0.229) (0.239) 
Inflation   -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.007 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Quality of institutions   1.554*** 1.622*** 1.291*** 0.253*** 0.207*** 0.455 0.475* 
    (0.236) (0.249) (0.233) (0.083) (0.075) (0.318) (0.286) 
English language -% 
population 
  1.768*** 1.519*** 1.695*** 0.117 0.109     
  (0.435) (0.514) (0.450) (0.156) (0.153)     
                  
Observations 1,186 1,178 1,178 1,178 987 987 1,167 975 
R-squared 0.595 0.728 0.729 0.738 0.925 0.926 0.176 0.243 
Number of countries             129 112 
Notes: all variables are in logs except dummies and percentages. HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies 
and constant in all regressions. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising data between 1999-2011. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
in the partner country improves the American FDI by 0.26% and the British FDI by 0.22%. 
Significance in both cases is at 1% (Models 3 in Tables 2.a. and 2.b.). Hence, the university ties 
built at the beginning of the seventies have strong and long lasting effects, which, on the US FDI, 
are stronger and more significant than those of the more recent cohorts (coefficient on International 
students1970 in Model 3 vs. coefficient on International students in Model 2, Table 2.a). An 
explanation for this difference in the US results might be based on the change occurred in the 
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composition of the students’ countries of origin: there were very few students from communist 
economies during the Cold War while now they are an important presence in American universities, 
but a similar change has also taken place in British universities, without leading to the same result. 
All the opposite, as Table 2.b. shows, the UK bilateral FDI are positively and significantly 
influenced by both the old and recent cohorts of international students. A more likely explanation of 
the non-significant effect of recent networks on the US FDI is the stagnation in student inflows in 
the US for some years after 2001, when in the UK and worldwide international student numbers 
were growing rapidly (Figures 1 and 6).    
As expected, the Alumni associations of US and UK universities exert a strong power of 
attraction on FDI in the alumni home countries. Specifically, a 1% increase in Alumni associations 
boosts the American FDI by almost 0.82%, but the result loses significance when the lagged 
dependent variable is added to the regression (Models 4-5, Table 2.a.), while a similar increase in 
the number of alumni associations of British universities increases the British FDI by 0.72% in the 
OLS regressions and by 0.15% (short run value) in the OLS-LDV specification, with significance, 
in both cases, at 1% (Models 4-5, Table 2.b). Also in this case, results on UK data are more robust. 
Control variables as GDP, Population and Distance have the expected signs. Inflation 
appears to be uncorrelated to the British investments abroad, but has a positive and significant 
correlation with American FDI, due perhaps to the relatively greater amount of investments from 
the this country into Latin American and other economies characterized by low macroeconomic 
stability. The Quality of institutions is strongly correlated with the UK investments abroad and not 
significant for the US FDI. This may be due to the relatively high amount of British investments in 
the European Union and in countries of the Commonwealth, a factor that is controlled for in the 
fixed effects regressions of Models 7 and 8 of Table 2.b. In both Tables 2.a. and 2.b. a higher 
percentage of people speaking English in the foreign country makes the country more attractive for 
American and British FDI. 
A usual matter of concern in the literature on FDI is that the variable may contain many 
zeroes. In this case, FDI are stocks rather than flows, and the proportion of zeroes is not very high: 
about 20% of all observations, both for the UK and the US FDI. However, a consequence of taking 
logs is that the conversion of zero FDI into missing values may introduce selection bias and cause 
loss of valuable information. To deal with this problem, as several other authors, I sum one to all 
FDI values before taking logs. As this procedure, in turn, may inflate coefficients, I re-ran all 
regressions without the adjustment. Results do not change significantly and are available upon 
request.  
5.2. Endogeneity: System GMM 
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TABLE 3 - USA and UK outward FDI. System GMM and IV GMM 
Dependent variable: USA and UK Outward FDI 
  USA USA USA   UK UK UK 
  
Sys 
GMM  IV GMM IV GMM   
Sys 
GMM  IV GMM IV GMM 
  
IV: 
Democracy      
UK-
Alumni  
IV: 
Democracy     
UK-
Alumni  
    IV: 
Democracy 
USA-
Alumni 
IV: 
Democracy 
USA-
Alumni 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
FDIt-1 0.993***   0.942***   0.828***   0.837*** 
  (0.024)   (0.018)   (0.062)   (0.056) 
                
International students 0.113       0.288**     
  (0.083)       (0.115)     
Alumni associations   1.040** 0.154*     1.338*** 0.239* 
    (0.405) (0.093)     (0.455) (0.136) 
                
GDP -0.020 1.048*** 0.017   -0.024 0.099 0.005 
  (0.050) (0.231) (0.041)   (0.035) (0.199) (0.033) 
Population -0.060 -0.507** -0.016   0.017 0.420 0.075 
  (0.063) (0.214) (0.041)   (0.066) (0.265) (0.062) 
Distance 0.088* -0.746*** 0.013   0.019 -0.323 -0.077 
  (0.051) (0.237) (0.043)   (0.044) (0.203) (0.047) 
Free trade agreements -0.031 0.059 -0.029   0.081 -0.036 -0.035 
  (0.078) (0.410) (0.074)   (0.117) (0.365) (0.081) 
Inflation 0.002 0.017*** 0.003**   0.003 -0.003 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.001)   (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Quality of institutions -0.010 -0.099 0.018   0.189* 0.928** 0.185** 
  (0.058) (0.308) (0.055)   (0.098) (0.361) (0.085) 
English language - 
percentage 0.001 0.014** 0.001   -0.001 1.269** 0.087 
  (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.589) (0.159) 
                
AR(2) test 0.281       0.892     
Hansen J test 0.113 0.3076 0.6231   0.564 0.3379 0.8581 
Hansen diff- J test 0.391       0.966     
A-P F test   21.9 16.96     16.43 10.42 
Number of instruments 110       121     
Number of countries 162 164 164   124     
Observations 1,088 1703 1,432   987 1,165 975 
R-squared   0.742 0.965     0.705 0.922 
Notes: all variables are in logs except dummies and percentages. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses. Time dummies, constant and country effects in all regressions. AR(2): Arellano 
and Bond tests for serial correlations. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising data between 1999-
2011. In SYS-GMM models control variables are all treated as predetermined and are instrumented for 
using their own lags in level and differences. Instruments in Models 3- 4 and 7-8: Democracy and Alumni 
associations of the other receiving country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Given that the above coefficients on International students and on Alumni associations 
could potentially suffer from endogeneity bias, I use the Blundell-Bond System GMM estimator in 
levels and differences. Results obtained with these regressions confirm and reinforce previous 
findings (Table 3). International students have a high and significant impact on the British FDI to 
their home economies, and a lower and weaker influence on the American investments abroad. The 
coefficient in Model 4, regarding the UK FDI, shows that a 1% increase in the number of 
international students in the United Kingdom leads to an improvement of 0.29% of the British FDI 
to the students’ home countries. The value of this GMM coefficient lies between the OLS values of 
Table 2.b, which were 0.18 and 0.44. The same coefficient in the regression concerning the US FDI 
is positive but not significant (Model 1).  
I use the Two Stage GMM estimator variable when the potentially endogenous variable is 
Alumni associations. Instruments are democracy in the partner country and Alumni associations of 
UK universities in the regressions on the US data and Alumni of US universities in the regressions 
on the UK dataset. Tests show that instruments perform well, their exogeneity and validity are not 
rejected (Table 3). First stage coefficients on Democracy and on the alumni associations of the other 
receiving country are all positive and significant. Second stage coefficients show that, as expected, 
the impact of Alumni associations on the FDI originating from the country of university studies are 
positive, strong and significant, even when the lagged dependent variable is included among the 
regressors. Specifically, the impact of a 1% increase in the number of Alumni associations in the 
partner country boosts American FDI to the country by 1% and British FDI by 1,34%. (Models 2 
and 5, Table 3), with significance at 10% in the US regressions and, respectively, 1% and 10% in 
the UK regressions. Both in the regressions on US and UK data, the IV-GMM coefficients are 
higher than the OLS coefficients of Table 2, suggesting that American and British FDI in the 
partner country do not significantly  promote the formation of associations. 
5.3 Soft, covert and hard power. 
Up to now, the different roles played by the US and UK on the international stage have not 
been considered, but they can affect the way in which American and British multinationals enter 
foreign markets, and the importance of education networks in this process. Hence, I add to the 
above specification two covariates. The first, Aid, meant as soft power, is the quantity of aid in US$ 
provided to the foreign country, and the second, Wars, indicating the use of force, is the number of 
wars fought with the foreign country since 1945. Subsequently, in the regressions on US data, I test 
the impact on FDI of the use of covert power – the number of CIA interventions in the partner 
country during the period 1945-1989 – and, in the regressions concerning the British FDI, I add the 
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number of British Council branches in the foreign country, an indicator of cultural diplomacy. 
 
Sys. GMM Sys. GMM Sys. GMM Sys. GMM Sys. GMM Sys GMM Sys GMM Sys GMM Sys GMM Sys. GMM
OECD = 0 OECD = 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FDIt-1 0.949*** 0.958*** 0.932*** 0.958*** 0.947*** 0.808*** 0.794*** 0.824*** 0.810*** 0.781***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.029) (0.016) (0.020) (0.069) (0.073) (0.064) (0.070) (0.083)
International students -0.138 0.146* 0.406** 0.115 0.158* 0.523*** 0.475*** 0.341** 0.422** 0.450**
(0.154) (0.076) (0.186) (0.086) (0.093) (0.181) (0.172) (0.135) (0.172) (0.198)
Aid -0.366 0.021 (0.020) 0.375** -0.050 -0.080
(0.221) (0.017) -0.015 (0.183) (0.035) (0.050)
Wars 0.077 0.002 0.002 0.791** 0.011 0.041
(0.082) (0.009) (0.011) (0.391) (0.018) (0.094)
CIA 0.756* 0.002 0.016
(0.425) (0.017) (0.023)
British Council 0.085 -0.033 -0.032
(0.115) (0.033) (0.051)
International students  x 0.054* -0.061**
 Aid (0.032) (0.028)
International students  x -0.009 -0.085**
 Wars (0.010) (0.042)
International students  x -0.104*
 CIA (0.058)
International students x -0.013
 British Council (0.013)
Total effect of -0.001 0.143* 0.325** 0.373** 0.411** 0.278**
International students (0.094) (0.074) (0.145) (0.128) (0.156) (0.104)
Total effect of Aid -0.006 0.032
(0.019) (0.036)
Total effect of Wars 0.014 0.311*
(0.019) (0.153)
Total effect of CIA 0.072
(0.047)
Total effect British Council 0.025
(0.044)
Other control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
AR (2) test 0.334 0.344 0.351 0.343 0.344 0.882 0.894 0.888 0.916 0.862
Hansen J test (P-value) 0.102 0.791 0.141 0.076 0.094 0.608 0.688 0.434 0.522 0.838
Hansen diff. J test (P-value) 0.615 0.994 0.776 0.456 0.443 0.709 0.957 0.455 0.876 0.869
Number of instruments 123 99 95 100 100 110 110 110 101 74
Number of countries 163 163 163 163 134 124 124 124 124 96
Observations 1,442 1,442 1,442 1,442 1,113 983 987 987 983 673
Table 4 - Soft power, covert power and war
Dependent variable: outward USA FDI Dependent variable: outward UK FDI
Notes: all variables are in logs except dummies and percentages. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Time dummies, 
constant and country effects in all regressions. AR(2): Arellano and Bond tests for serial correlations. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising 
data between 1999-2011. In SYS-GMM models control variables are all treated as predetermined and are instrumented for using their own first to 
third lags in level and differences. The total effect of International students  is calculated summing the coefficients on International students  and 
on the interaction term, evaluated, respectively, at average CIA , Wars  and Aid.  The total effect of CIA , Wars  and Aid  are calculated summing the 
coefficients on, respectively, CIA,  Wars  and Aid  and on the interacted term, calculated at average level of International students . *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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These variables are expected to affect FDI directly, but of special interest are their interactions with 
the effects of International students. 
 The results of Table 4 show that the total effect of Aid on FDI is non-significant, both in the 
US and UK regressions (Models 1 and 6). However, aid to other countries appears to have an effect 
on FDI that is complementary to that of international students: coefficient on the interacted variable 
International students x Aid in the US regression is low but positive and significance at the 10% 
level. The coefficient of the same interaction is instead negative when the dependent variable is the 
British FDI: a unit increase of international students in UK together with a unit increase in Aid from 
the UK to the foreign country tends to curtail the separate effects of International students and Aid 
on FDI, suggesting that, in this case, the two forms of soft power substitute each other.   
 Wars are the opposite of soft power: they are expected to disrupt economic relations 
(Martin et al., 2008) and social ties between countries. Differently than expected, the total effect of 
Wars on UK FDI is positive and significant (Model 7, Table 4), perhaps because after the second 
world war the UK has mostly participated into armed conflicts having political and humanitarian 
goals, while the same coefficient is not significant when the dependent variable is US FDI (Model 
2). The interaction between wars and international students, however, is as expected: armed conflict 
reduces the positive effects of education ties on investments. The networks of international students 
from countries with which there has been armed conflict have a weaker influence on FDI.  The 
coefficient on the interacted variable International students x Wars is negative both for the US and 
the UK, while it is significant only for the latter. Interestingly, the US coefficient on the interacted 
term becomes negative and significant if Vietnam (an outlier in terms of years of war, but among 
the top fifteen countries in terms of foreign students in American universities) is excluded from the 
panel, evidencing that students from Vietnam are compensating for the disruptive effects of war on 
the relations between the two countries. The negative effect of wars on education networks is even 
more reinforced if two countries, Vietnam and Korea, are excluded from the sample.  
The total impact on US FDI of CIA interventions in the partner country is non-significant 
(Model 3, Table 4). This differs from Berger et al. (2013), who find a positive effect of CIA on 
exports. This paper’s result measures the impact on FDI and not on trade, but, in this respect, effects 
could be expected to be similar. Rather, Berger et al. measure the effect of CIA interventions on 
trade flows occurring during the Cold War period, while this paper’s result concerns FDI and a 
longer run. It shows that CIA interventions of 1945-89 have not had long lasting effects on the US 
FDI of 1999-2011. On the other hand, as expected, the joint impact of CIA with education 
networks, International students x CIA, is negative and significant (Model 3). The positive 
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influence of student networks on FDI shrinks as the partner country experience more CIA 
interventions. More generally, the use of covert power can weaken the positive effects of persuasion 
and soft power. Finally, Models 4 and 9 in Table 4 report the results of the regressions including all 
covariates: an increase of 1% in International students from country c increases the UK FDI in 
country c by 0.42% (Model 9). This result is similar to previous coefficients, showing that results 
on UK data are quite robust. The same regression shows that International students have no 
significant effect on the American FDI (Model 4). However, when the full equation is re-run with a 
reduced sample including only non-OECD countries, the coefficient on international students does 
not change significantly in the UK regression (Model 10), while it becomes significant at the 10% 
level in the US regressions. International student ties affect the American investments in developing 
countries. 
The overall magnitude of these effects can now be taken into consideration. The number of 
international students from the average country in the United Kingdom is 1791. A 10% increase in 
the average number of registered students would amount to an increase of 179 students per country. 
The stocks of British investments in the average foreign country amount to $12,573 million. Then, 
the 10% increase in students would lead to a 4.22% increase in the stock of FDI (coefficient on 
International students, Model 9), or to an extra value of $531 million. This means that one 
additional average student would generate an increase of $2.96 million in the British stock of FDI in  
his home economy.  
As above, the magnitude of the impact of non-OECD students on the United States 
investments abroad can be calculated by considering that a 10% increase in students from the 
average non-OECD country (Table 1) amounts to 260 more students, and that this increase leads to 
1.58% more US FDI in the non-OECD country (Model 5, Table 4). The value of the average US 
investment in the non-OECD country is $3,324.80 (Table 1), and 1.58% of it is $52.53 million. 
Hence, an extra student from a non-OECD country generates an increase in the stock of FDI from 
the United States in the student’s home economy of $202,057. The substantial difference between 
the impact of international students on British and American FDI depends on the smaller magnitude 
of the coefficient on International students in the US regressions, and on its significance being 
restricted to non-OECD economies, where the average value of the American FDI is about twenty 
times smaller than in OECD countries (Table 1). Interestingly, the coefficient on International 
students in the United States further increases to 0.26 if also Arab countries are excluded from the 
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dataset. As shown in Figure A.1, the number of students in American universities originating from 
Arab countries markedly fall for a few years after 2001.6  
Similar calculations can help to make clear the magnitude of the effect of Alumni 
associations. As the number of associations of American universities in the average country is 
10.23, an increase of 10% would lead to 1.02 more association per country. The average value of 
US FDI per country is $15,943 million. From Model 2 in Table 3, the increase in associations 
would lead to a 10% increase in US investments abroad, which is $1,594 million. Hence, one more 
association of alumni in the foreign country would boost the American FDI in the country by 
$1,563 million. Similar calculations can be performed for the United Kingdom. As the average 
number of alumni associations of British universities in the foreign country is 11.35, a 10% increase 
would lead to 1.13 more associations. From Model 5 in Table 3, this would determine a 13.38% 
increase in the British FDI, and, given that the average value of British FDI is $12.573 million, to 
an increase of $1,488 million. Hence, an extra alumni association in the partner country would 
increase the stock of British FDI in the country by $1,489 million. The huge magnitude of these 
effects depend on the variable Alumni associations being an indicator of the effective networking 
activity of a vast number of alumni, who, moreover, often are influential professionals, 
businessman, managers, politicians or policy makers.  
5.4. Robustness. 
Previous results show that students registered in the early seventies still have a strong effect 
on US and UK FDI, but that the effect on US FDI vanishes with the more recent cohorts of 
students. As a further check of robustness, I test the effect on FDI of foreign students registered in 
US universities fifteen years after 1970, in 1985, still during the Cold War period. Results, in Model 
1 of Table 5, show that International students1985 also have a positive and significant impact on the 
US FDI of 1999-2011. The magnitude of the coefficient is similar to that of International 
students1970 (of Table 2). Furthermore, the coefficient is robust to the introduction of the CIA 
variable among the covariates, while, as in previous tests, CIA interventions have no direct effect on 
FDI (Model 2, Table 5). The coefficient on the interacted variable International students1985 x CIA,  
is negative and significant, supporting previous findings suggesting that the use of covert power has 
a negative influence on international education ties (Model 3). The same exercise is performed with 
students registered during 1993/94, International students1993, and results are overall the same 
(Models 4-6, Table 5). The year 1993 has been chosen because it is the first in which UNESCO 
                                                            
6 The magnitude of the impact is much higher than that of an average business immigrants in the USA on USA imports 
($61,637) in  Aleksynska and Peri (2014), or that of an average international student on British imports ($56,028) and 
exports ($31,430) in Murat (2014), but the average flow of American and British imports and exports is also several 
times smaller than the stocks of these countries’ investments abroad.  
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statistics clearly capture the new world order, after the fall of the Berlin wall, and supplies distinct 
figures for students from countries of the former Soviet Unions.  These findings provide support to 
two previous results: the first is that international students of the Cold War period, and immediately 
after, have a positive and significant effect on the US FDI, an effect that is lost with the cohorts of 
the last decade. The second is that CIA interventions have a disruptive impact on international 
education ties and a weak or non-robust direct influence on FDI.  Finally, the above regressions 
have been rerun with other institutional and cultural covariates, among which the proportion of 
people of Christian religion in the partner country and, regarding the UK FDI, the status of ex-
colony or Commonwealth member of the partner country. Results do not change significantly.  
 
Table 5. -  International students in the United States and CIA interventions. 
Dependent variable: US outward FDI (OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
International students1985 0.245*** 0.202*** 0.221***       
 
(0.074) (0.076) (0.074)       
International students1985 x CIA     -0.140**       
      (0.068)       
International students1993       0.361*** 0.295*** 0.323*** 
        (0.106) (0.108) (0.109) 
International students1993 x CIA           -0.100** 
            (0.050) 
CIA   0.139 1.156**   0.162* 0.887** 
    (0.089) (0.490)   (0.088) (0.371) 
Control variables  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,657 1,657 1,657 
R-squared 0.747 0.749 0.753 0.746 0.749 0.752 
Notes: all variables are in logs except dummies and percentages. HAC robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies 
and constant in all regressions. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising data between 1999-2011. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the influence of education networks on the investments abroad of 
the United States and the United Kingdom during 1999-2011. Proxies for education networks were 
international students, alumni associations of American and British universities in foreign countries 
and former students, who attended university during the Cold War period. 
Results show that education ties tend to have strong, robust and long-lasting effects on the 
foreign investments of the United Kingdom in the students’ home countries and a weak impact on 
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the American FDI. Specifically, international students have a positive and significant influence only 
on the American investments going to non-developed and non-Arab economies, but even in this 
restricted set of countries, their influence on FDI is weak compared to that of international students 
who attended British universities. The impact of the latter on FDI is about three times that of 
international students of American universities, and is more evenly distributed among developed 
and developing economies. Differently, former international students who attended university in the 
early seventies have a similar positive impact on both British and American investments into their 
home economies. The associations of alumni abroad attract very substantial amounts of both 
American and British FDI into the alumni home countries, but, also in this case, the alumni 
associations of British universities have the highest influence on FDI.  
International students may act as ‘ambassadors’, who facilitate the transfer of the culture, 
institutions and economic norms of the host country into their country of origin. The recent 
literature identifies them as effective channels of soft power directed to the elites (Nye, 2005). This 
paper’s findings provide support for this view, especially in relation to the United Kingdom. To 
better investigate the reasons for the differing effects between United States and United Kingdom, 
other expressions of power – economic aid and cultural diplomacy, wars, and covert action, in the 
form of CIA interventions in the foreign country during the cold war – have also been tested. 
Results are that the interactions between the different forms of soft power are mixed, but those 
between international students and wars, or international students and covert action are negative: 
wars and CIA interventions disrupt the positive effects on FDI of international education ties. At the 
same time, the direct effects of wars and covert actions on the American FDI appear to be non-
significant. The recent debate seems to suggest that soft power that is not backed by hard power can 
be totally ineffective; this paper’s results suggest that hard and covert power without the 
contemporary use of persuasion can also be unsuccessful.  
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Table A.1. - Top 20 non-OECD countries. 
FDI Students Alumni associations 
US 
Singapore 64737.3 China 86593 China 110 
Brazil 39087.6 India 74277 India 81 
Hong Kong  37197.8 Thailand 9592 Hong Kong  46 
China 25790.8 Indonesia 9003 Brazil 42 
Chile 13853.4 Brazil 7934 Singapore 38 
Bahamas 13805.5 Hong Kong  7731 Thailand 36 
Argentina 13147.9 Colombia 6812 Argentina 30 
Indonesia 11489.3 Malaysia 6766 Philippines 27 
Venezuela 10369.4 Saudi Arabia 6663 United Arab Emirates 27 
India 9968.6 Pakistan 6249 Israel 26 
Malaysia 9718.2 Kenya 6234 Malaysia 24 
Thailand 8356.7 Nepal 5712 Colombia 23 
Russian Federation 8106.2 Russian Federation 5555 Saudi Arabia 23 
Israel 7317.2 Nigeria 5311 Indonesia 21 
Philippines 5694.9 Vietnam 5239 Russian Federation 21 
Panama 5577.7 Venezuela 4965 Chile 21 
Kazakhstan 5483.3 Jamaica 4024 Pakistan 20 
Egypt 5394.7 Singapore 3935 Vietnam 18 
Saudi Arabia 5109.9 Philippines 3508 Peru 18 
Algeria 4691.8 Peru 3235 South Africa 17 
            
UK 
Hong Kong  30045.1 China 34801 India 100 
South Africa 15973.2 India 16762 China 77 
Singapore 11865.5 Malaysia 11218 Malaysia 46 
United Arab Emirates 7919.0 Hong Kong  9306 Hong Kong  46 
Russian Federation 7052.5 Nigeria 7587 Pakistan 45 
Brazil 6165.2 Cyprus 6297 Singapore 39 
India 5378.2 Pakistan 5654 Nigeria 36 
China 4757.6 Singapore 3966 United Arab Emirates 31 
Argentina 2965.1 Thailand 3645 Thailand 28 
Egypt 2823.6 Saudi Arabia 2915 Cyprus 24 
Kazakhstan 2796.4 Kenya 2604 South Africa 19 
Colombia 2684.9 Sri Lanka 2332 Kenya 18 
Malaysia 2510.5 Zimbabwe 2230 Argentina 18 
Malta 2280.4 Russian Federation 1992 Brazil 17 
Chile 2177.8 Ghana 1974 Ghana 16 
Nigeria 2142.8 Bangladesh 1930 Mauritius 16 
Indonesia 2052.9 United Arab Emirates 1743 Indonesia 16 
Thailand 2013.0 Iran 1694 Sri Lanka 15 
Saudi Arabia 1982.3 Mauritius 1530 Saudi Arabia 14 
Mauritius 1450.1 South Africa 1384 Bangladesh 14 
Notes: Averages, 1999-2011.       
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Table A.2. - Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
International students Students who left their country of origin 
and moved to another country for the 
purpose of study. Number of students 
enrolled refers to the count of students 
studying in the reference period. 
UNESCO. International flows of mobile 
students at the tertiary level (ISCED 5 
and 6) 
Alumni Alumni groups and associations in 
partner countries of graduates, 
respectively, from US or UK 
Universities. 
Own databases. Data collected during 
2012 from US and UK Universities’ 
websites or provided by Central offices of 
Alumni associations. Includes only 
officially recognized groups from 50 UK 
and 62 US universities. 
International 
students1970 
Number of students enrolled during 
1970/71 in US or UK. 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1973) 
FDI Stocks, in US $, millions. OECD Statistics. 
GDP In US $, millions. IMF – Statistics 
Population Number of people, millions. IMF – Statistics 
Distance Great circle distance between capital 
cities and Washington or London (Km).  
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele
/bdd.asp 
Inflation Rate of change. IMF – Statistics 
Language Proportion of people speaking English 
over total population. 
Melitz and Toubal (2012)  
CIA World Factbook. 
Quality of 
institutions 
Worldwide Governance Indicator. 
Includes six dimensions of governance: 
Voice and accountability Political 
stability and absence of violence; 
Government effectiveness; Regulatory 
quality; Rule of Law; Control of 
corruption.  
World Bank. Developed by Kaufmann et 
al. (2009). The six indicators are 
measured in units ranging from about -2.5 
to 2.5, with higher values corresponding 
to better governance outcomes.  
Free trade 
agreements 
United States and European Union (for 
the United Kingdom) free trade 
agreements with the partner country. 
OECD Statistics 
Democracy Indicator variable that equals one if 
an observation is a democracy. Based 
on objective criteria about the extent to 
which government positions are filled 
by contested elections 
Cheibub et al (2010). 
Aid Total Official Flows: The sum of 
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) and Other Official Flows 
(OOF) represents the total gross 
disbursements by the official 
sector at large to the recipient country. 
($ millions) 
OECD Statistics 
Wars Years of armed conflict between US or 
UK and foreign country since 1945. 
Correlates of War Project 
CIA Number of CIA interventions in foreign 
country, 1945-1989. 
Berger et al. (2013) AER database. 
British Council  Number of British Council branches in 
foreign country in 2005. 
British Council Annual Report 2005-
2006. Measuring Success: 
http://www.britishcouncil.org/bc-annual-
report-2005-2006.pdf 
 
Countries: Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan 
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Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana 
Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African 
Chile China Colombia Congo, Republic Congo, Dem. Rep Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic 
Denmark Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji 
Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guyana Haiti Honduras 
Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya 
Korea, Republic Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jam Liechtenstein Lithuania 
Luxembourg Macao Macedonia FYR Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico 
Moldova, Rep.  Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger 
Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania 
Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Lucia Saint Vincent Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra 
Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden 
Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey 
Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Vietnam Yemen 
Zambia Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
